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Capital Flows, Capital Control and
Exchange Rate Regimes
Jonathan A. Aremu, Ph.D
I.

Introduction

O

ver the years, economists have debated about the optimal choice
between the speed and sequencing of economic reforms. One of these
debates relates to easing of capital account controls as it affects the
capital account of the balance of payments (BOP). While some economists view
liberal cross-border movement of capital as welfare enhancing, others deem it
damaging, especially for developing countries. According to the latter group,
free capital mobility heightens macroeconomic volatility and the vulnerability of
developing countries to external shocks. Thus, liberalisation of the capital account
should be gradual and should be undertaken after other reforms and market
liberalisation have been concluded. On the other hand, proponents of
liberalisation see no reasons to delay the ease capital mobility as restrictions result
in serious economic costs, inefficiencies and resource misallocation.
Whereas capital controls were seen as ―orthodox‖ necessity by the conveners of
the Bretton Woods (BW) system, their ideas were discarded during the neo-liberal
era that began in the late 1970s. What was once fulcrum of the international
monetary system—regulating capital flows to maintain policy autonomy and
stabilise exchange rates—became heresy. However, following the array of the
financial crisis since the late-1990s, there is an emerging consensus that capital
controls can play a legitimate role in promoting financial stability in domestic and
international environments (Akyuz, 2012). In fact, the World Bank (2013) stated
that the recent financial crisis has challenged conventional thinking of financial
policies and consequently capital flows, and has given greater credence to the
idea that active state involvement in the financial sector can help maintain
economic stability, drive growth, and create jobs.
In the immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis, the world economy was
characterised as undergoing a ―two-speed‖ recovery. The industrialised nations,
where the crisis started, experienced slow growth whereas many emerging
market and developing countries grew significantly. The growth asymmetries
reinforced by wide interest rate differentials across the globe, triggered significant
flows of financial resources, based on the perceived relative higher marginal
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productivity of capital in emerging and developing economies in congruence
with economic theory. The concurrence of low interest rates and slow growth in
the global north with relatively high interest rates and fast growth in the global
south, encouraged divestment from the rich economies of the north, and to the
south.
However, without government intervention, accelerated capital flows may have
adverse consequences both for the source and the recipient economies. It is
believed that large surges of short-term and potentially reversible capital that
flows to developing countries can have negative effects. Firstly, these surges can
pose complex policy dilemmas for macroeconomic management, as they can
initially push key macroeconomic variables, such as exchange rate and prices of
assets like property and shares, away from what could be considered their longterm equilibrium. Secondly, and more important, these flows can pose the risk of
very sharp reversals with little or no notice. Such reversals – particularly if they lead
to currency and financial crises – can result in very serious losses of output,
investment and employment, as well as increases in poverty.
On this basis, economies of the south fear that the flood of capital from the north
may affect their exchange rates, while stirring current account deficits and asset
bubbles, if appropriate policies are not put in place. With such surge in capital
inflow, the value of their currencies could appreciate – making it harder for
companies and farmers in these economies to export, and thus causing job losses
and a general lack of competitiveness. Furthermore, unfettered speculation of
capital flows could also raise the price of stock, bond and real-estate markets –
threatening to create bubbles such as the one that was started in the US in 2008.
Therefore, the movement to outlaw capital controls began to lose popularity
given that premature capital account liberalisation in part caused the Asian Crisis
of 1997-8. However, nations, such as Malaysia that used capital controls to avoid
the worst of that crisis were better off. The fears of the emerging and developing
countries have equally attracted the attention of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) to take steps to address the issue; making the Fund to change its mind
in favour of the capital restrictions. This new position of the IMF's was based on
findings which suggested that borrowing in a low-interest economies coupled
with loose capital controls brought about the Great Depression in 1929.
The ‗explanandum’ from these premises points to the fact that regulatory controls
of cross-border capital flows can complement both the macroeconomic policy.
Indeed, since it was shown that countries that used such regulations were less
affected during financial crisis, the objective of this presentation is to examine the
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importance of capital controls on the flow of foreign capital under the current
circumstance for the benefit of the Nigerian economy. Part II of the paper will
look into some critical issues in the global capital flows by identifying the principal
agents; structure and trends of the flows; effects; and policy options in managing
the flows. In Part III, an attempt is made to review the historical developments of
global governance of capital controls since the pre-World War I, while Part IV
examines the policy challenges in capital control management strategies. Part V
examines the on-going ECOWAS financial integration among its Member States,
coming at a time of increasing voice for a return to the Bretton Woods‘s ideology.
Part VI concludes the paper with charting a framework for increasing the
resilience of the Nigerian capital flow system.

II.

Issues in Global Capital Flows

The integration of a country‘s local financial system with the international
financial markets and institutions typically requires that governments liberalise the
domestic financial sector and the capital account. Although developed
countries are the most active participants in the process, developing countries,
like Nigeria as well, have also been participating. While the integration of
developing countries with the international financial system is not a new
phenomenon, the depth and breadth of it today are unprecedented. Hitherto,
capital flows tended to follow migration and were directed towards supporting
trade flows under the gold standard (in which gold backed national currencies).
The main benefit of financial globalisation for developing countries is the
development of their financial system (more complete, deeper, more stable, and
better-regulated financial markets). To Levine (1999), there are two main
channels through which financial globalisation promotes such financial
development. First, financial globalisation implies that a new type of capital and
more capital is available to developing countries. Among other things, this new
and more capital allows countries to better smooth consumption, deepens
financial markets, and increases the degree of market discipline. Second,
financial globalisation leads to a better financial infrastructure, which mitigates
information asymmetries and, as a consequence, reduces problems such as
adverse selection and moral hazard.
It must, however, be pointed out here that capital account liberalisation is neither
necessary nor sufficient to attract foreign capital. China is held as an example of
a country that was receiving large amounts of Greenfield foreign direct
investment (FDI) without pursuing an open capital account regime, while many
African countries were receiving very little despite a rapid liberalisation of their
capital account. Thus, for successful integration, economic fundamentals need
to be and remain strong, and local markets need to be properly regulated and
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supervised. The need for these strong fundamentals is key since financial
globalisation tends to intensify a country‘s sensitivity to foreign shocks. Moreover,
international market imperfections, such as herding, panics, and boom-burst
cycles, as well as the fluctuating nature of capital flows can lead to crises and
contagion, even in countries with good economic fundamentals.

II.1

Agents of Global Capital Flows

There are three main agents of financial globalisation: governments, borrowers
and investors, and financial institutions.

1.

Governments

Governments could allow capital flows by liberalising restrictions on the domestic
financial sector and the capital account of their BOP or impose controls on crosscountry capital movements. Six possible reasons explain the wave of financial
liberalisation during the Washington Consensus era by various countries across the
world. First, governments found capital controls to be increasingly costly and
difficult to maintain effectively. Second, policymakers have become increasingly
aware that government led financial systems and non-market approaches have
failed. Third, the importance of foreign capital to finance government budgets
and smooth public consumption and investment became understood as foreign
capital has helped governments capitalise banks with problems, conduct
corporate restructuring, and manage crises. Fourth, opening up the privatisation
of public companies to foreign investors has helped increase their receipts. Fifth,
although governments can also tax revenue from foreign capital, they might find
this harder to do than with other factors of production because of its footloose
nature. Sixth, governments have become increasingly convinced of the benefits
of a more efficient and robust domestic financial system for growth and stability
of the economy and for the diversification of the public and private sectors‘
investor base.

2.

Borrowers and Investors

Borrowers and investors, including households and firms, have also become main
agents of financial globalisation. By borrowing abroad, firms and individuals can
relax their financial constraints to smooth consumption and investment. Firms can
expand their financing alternatives by raising funds directly through bonds and
equity issues in international markets and thereby reducing the cost of capital,
expanding their investor base, and increasing liquidity. As rationalised by Aremu
(2005), borrowing countries benefit not only from new capital but also, in the case
of FDI, from new technology know-how, management, and employee training.
More financing alternatives help foreign investors overcome direct and indirect
investment barriers. International investors, as argued by Obstfeld (2001) have
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taken advantage of financial globalisation to achieve cross-country risk
diversification of their portfolios. Consequently, institutions and individuals in
developed countries can easily invest in emerging/developing countries markets
through buying shares of international mutual funds (including global, regional,
and country funds) as shown in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). Investors can also
purchase depository receipts, cross-listed shares of international companies, and
international corporate and sovereign bonds in international capital markets.

3.

Financial Institutions

Financial institutions, through the internationalisation of financial services, are also
a major driving force of global capital flow. According to the IMF (2000), changes
at the global level as well as changes in both developed and developing
countries explain the role of financial institutions as a force of globalisation. At a
global level, the gains in information technology have diminished the importance
of geography, allowing international corporations to service several markets from
one location. The improvement in information technology has had three main
effects on the financial services delivery across countries as they:




promoted a more intensive use of international financial institutions,
led to a major consolidation and restructuring of the world financial
services industry, and
gave rise to global banks and international conglomerates that provide a
mix of financial products and services in a broad range of markets and
countries, blurring the distinctions between financial institutions and the
activities and markets in which they engage.

In developing countries alike, the liberalisation of the regulatory systems has
opened the door for international firms to participate in local markets. The
privatisation of public financial institutions has equally provided foreign banks
increasing opportunities to enter local financial markets. Macroeconomic
stabilisation, a better business environment, and stronger fundamentals in
emerging/developing markets have ensured a more attractive climate for
foreign investment.

II.2

Structure of Global Private Capital Flows

Flows of capital do occur from one nation to another in exchange for significant
ownership stakes, for higher returns on capital invested in host companies or for
other reasons. There are varieties of such flows:
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Foreign Direct Investment

FDI occurs when new companies are set up or existing companies are taken over
by foreign enterprises in developing countries. FDI has proved to be resilient
during financial crises. For instance, in the East Asian countries, such investment
was remarkably stable during the global financial crisis in 1997-98. In sharp
contrast, other forms of private capital flows—portfolio equity and debt flows,
and particularly short-term flows—were subject to large reversals during the same
period (Dadush, Dasgupta, and Ratha, 2000). The gains to host countries from FDI
can take several other forms: FDI allows the transfer of technology—particularly in
the form of new varieties of capital inputs—that cannot be achieved through
financial investments or trade in goods and services. FDI can also promote
competition in the domestic input market. Recipient of FDI often gain employee
training in the course of operating the new business. Profits generated by FDI
contribute to corporate tax revenues in the host country.

2.

Portfolio Investment (Debt)

Portfolio debt investment occurs when a foreign entity purchases debt securities
such as bonds issued by another country or an institution in another country.
Developing countries generally welcome the inflows of foreign portfolio debt
investment, which they often see as a vote of confidence in their economic
management. Portfolio debt investment has contributed to lower government
borrowing costs by exerting downward pressure on domestic interest rates. But
there are risks attached to this kind of investment. Volatile private debt capital
inflows can complicate the management of exchange rate and monetary
policy. As the experience of other developing countries show, portfolio capital
inflows can reverse sharply, leading to large swings in exchange and interest
rates, as it occurred in the South East Asian economies in the late 1990‘s.

3.

Portfolio Investment (Equity)

Portfolio equity investment occurs when foreign entities invest in a local stock
market by buying shares in local companies. However, the number of developing
countries with stock markets is very few. Moreover, most of them are very small or
underdeveloped to absorb relative large portfolio equity investment. Except for
South Africa and Nigeria, the markets are small. To broaden the capital market,
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is collaborating with
regional stakeholders in the establishment of regional capital market. Already,
the West African Capital Market Integration Council (WACMIC) was inaugurated
by the President of ECOWAS Commission early in 2013. This kind of reforms could
support development of the region to become attractive to portfolio equity
investments.
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International Bank Lending (Loan)

Another noteworthy trend in the 1990s was the substantial rise in the share of
private borrowing in total borrowing. Short-term international debt is defined as
cross-border debt with a maturity of one year or less. One potential advantage
of global financial integration may be the enlarged access it gives countries to
smooth consumption by using short-term loan in the face of adverse economic
shocks. But the advantage of contracting short-term debt for counter-cyclical
purposes can be wiped out if lenders‘ decision, changes in risk perceptions, and
other factors make access to such short-term capital flows pro-cyclical.
Moreover, shocks may attract large capital inflows and encourage consumption
and investment at levels that are unsustainable in the longer term, and countries
may be forced to over-adjust to adverse shocks when capital reverses.
Short-term capital flows appear to be pro-cyclical in developing countries,
increasing when economic growth is accelerating and declining during
economic slowdown. In addition, short-term lending is driven by external (or
―push‖) factors. For instance, when short-term interest rates drop in industrial
countries it causes an expansion in global liquidity. Some of this encourage shortterm lending to developing countries. Two reasons may explain the pro-cyclical
behavior of short-term capital flows. First, economic shocks tend to be large and
more frequent in developing countries, due to weak economic bases and
greater dependence on primary commodity exports. Adverse shocks cause a
country‘s creditworthiness to be downgraded. Changes in risk perception and
rating downgrades can lead to rationing of credit to marginally creditworthy
borrowers, and such changes can worsen rather than smooth their adjustment.
Second, these negative effects are exacerbated by information asymmetry
between borrowers and lenders, which may trigger herd behaviour as panicked
investors rush to withdraw their capital in response to an adverse shock.
Of the different types of private capital flows discussed so far, short-term loans are
the most likely to be withdrawn during difficult times. This is because the cost of
pulling out is minimal for lenders of short-term debt, whereas liquidating FDI may
involve selling plant and machinery, and selling stocks or bonds during a crisis
usually involves a loss for the sellers. In sum, international debt flows, especially of
the short-term variety is risky. It is driven by speculative considerations based on
interest rate differentials and exchange rate expectations, not on long-term
considerations. Its movement is often the result of moral hazard distortions such as
implicit exchange rate guarantees or the willingness of governments to bailout
the banking system. It is the first to run for the exits in times of trouble and is
responsible for boom-busrt cycles of the late 1990‘s in the South East Asian
economies.
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Remittances

Remittances are closely associated with outward migration, but policies matter,
too. Usually, a lower transaction costs and the absence of exchange restrictions,
black market exchange rate premiums, and unstable macroeconomic
environments have been associated with higher remittances. In addition,
remittances are less volatile than other private capital flows and that they tend to
move counter-cyclically with recipient country income (Chami et al., 2005).
Furthermore, remittances tend to be a stable source of foreign exchange
earnings. Migrants usually send more money when the family back home
experiences hardships, for whatever reason, and therefore remittances act as
insurance against economic adversity. Also, remittances have been remarkably
resilient during global economic crises. In sum, remittances reduce poverty,
increase welfare, and provide foreign currency that enables countries to pay for
essential imports and service external debt. That in turn improves access to
international capital markets.
At a macroeconomic level, however, large sustained remittance flows may lead
to currency appreciation, with adverse consequences for exports. Moreover,
some analysts say remittances dampen growth because recipients may become
dependent on them and work less. Finally, an even more insidious effect of
remittances on economic development and well-being is their impact on
institutions and governance. A remittance-receiving household no longer has to
care as much about the quality of the government and its ability to provide
infrastructure and institutions that facilitate growth. If conditions are bad at home,
families send more members abroad and use remittance income to compensate
for the lack of government services. They lose interest in pressuring the
government to deliver better services. The government, for its part, does not feel
compelled to provide these services because it realises that these households
can fend for themselves, and the quality of government declines even further.
Hence, remittances are not the highway to a better future.

II.3

Innovative Sources of Private Capital for Development

Innovative financing approaches are required, especially for private sector
borrowers in developing countries, who face ever harsher credit rationing than
public sector borrowers. Some innovative market-based financing mechanisms
that developing countries could use include:

a)

Diaspora Bonds

The rationale behind diaspora bonds is twofold. For the countries, diaspora bonds
represent a stable and cheap source of external finance, especially in times of
financial stress. For investors, diaspora bonds offer the opportunity to display
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patriotism by helping their country of origin. Furthermore, the worst case scenario
for diaspora bond is that debt service payments by the issuer are in local rather
than hard currency. But because diaspora bond investors often have liabilities in
their country of origin, they are likely to view the risk of receiving payments in local
currency with much less trepidation than would non-diaspora investors.

b)

Performance-Indexed Bonds

Coupons on this kind of bonds are set to vary according to the growth
performance of a country‘s GDP, a proxy for its ability to pay. This feature lets a
developing country to follow counter-cyclical fiscal policy, paying less during an
economic slowdown and more during an expansion. It is plausible that
developing countries would be willing to pay a higher rate on indexed bonds
than they would pay on fixed-coupon bonds to be able to avoid potential debt
defaults. Similar to the growth-indexed bonds issued by sovereigns, sub-sovereign
borrowers could issue performance-indexed bonds. A performance-indexed
bond would be linked to a well-defined indicator of the performance of the
borrowing entity.

c)

Future-Flow Securitisation

Securitisation is provided to allow for decline in the value of the underlying
collateral, debt securitised by future hard-currency receivables will be a viable
option for developing countries seeking to raise funds in the prevailing
environment of low global risk appetite. By pledging future hard-currency
receivables, securitised transactions subordinate the interests of current and
future creditors. The transactions backed by future revenue streams are
structured so that the payments do not enter the issuer‘s home country until
obligations to bond investors are met.

II.4

Trends in Global Capital Flows

It has been discovered that financial globalisation has proceeded at a more
rapid pace than trade over the past few years as developing countries
experienced surge in capital inflows after mid-2009 followed by reversal in the
course of 2011 as the European debt crisis worsened (see fig, 1). Renewed
disruptive exchange rate swings vis-à-vis the United States dollar broadly mirrored
the tidal flows of private capital. Global finance remains in upheaval (IIF,2012)
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Figure1. Private Capital Flows to Emerging and Developing Economies,
1980-2011 (US$ billion)

Source: International Financial Institute, 2012
The rise in international capital flows involving developing countries has led to a
corresponding rise in cross-border financial holdings and an expansion in their
international investment positions, recording foreign assets and liabilities. The
relative rise in developing countries gross foreign assets and liabilities provides
further evidence of progressing financial globalisation. As financial globalisation
proved hazardous in the experience of many developing countries, maintenance
of a competitive exchange rate became a policy focus. If foreign exchange
market interventions are used to contain pressures for currency appreciation, a
build-up of international reserves arises as a by-product. Perhaps the rule of
finance over trade in the modern age of accelerated globalisation is best
illustrated by trading in foreign exchange markets.
Risks and Net Effects of Global Capital Flows
Although financial globalisation has several potential benefits, it can also carry
some risks. The recent stream of financial crises and contagion after countries
liberalised their financial systems and became integrated with world financial
markets might lead some to suggest that globalisation generates financial
volatility and crises (Gallagher (2011). Though domestic factors tend to be key
determinants of crises, there are different channels through which financial
globalisation can be related to crises.
First, when a country liberalises its financial system, it becomes subject to
international market discipline exercised by both foreign and domestic investors.
When an economy is closed, only domestic investors monitor the economy and
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react to unsound fundamentals. In open economies, the joint force of domestic
and foreign investors could encourage countries to achieve sound fundamentals
although this process might take a long time.
Secondly, financial globalisation can also lead to crises if there are imperfections
in international financial markets, which can generate bubbles, irrational
behaviour, herding behaviour, speculative attacks, and crashes, among other
things. Imperfections in international capital markets can lead to crises even in
countries with sound fundamentals. For example, if investors believe that the
exchange rate is unsustainable they may speculate against the currency, which
can lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy on balance-of-payments crisis regardless of
market fundamentals.
Thirdly, financial globalisation can lead to crises as a result of the importance of
external factors on an economy, even in countries with sound fundamentals and
even in the absence of imperfections in international capital markets. If a country
becomes dependent on foreign capital, sudden shifts in foreign capital flows can
create financing difficulties and economic downturns. These shifts do not
necessarily depend on country fundamentals. Calvo et al., (1996) argue that
external factors are important determinants of capital flows to developing
countries. In particular, they find that world interest rates were a significant
determinant of capital inflows into Asia and Latin America during the 1990s.
Economic cyclical movements in developed countries, a global drive towards
diversification of investments in major financial centers, and regional effects tend
to be other important global factors. Frankel and Rose (1996) highlight the role
that foreign interest rates play in determining the likelihood of financial crises in
developing countries.
Fourth, financial globalisation can also lead to financial crises through contagion,
namely by shocks that are transmitted across countries. Three broad channels of
such contagion can be identified as: real links, financial links, and herding
behaviour, or ―unexplained high correlations.‖ Real links is associated with trade
links. When two countries trade among themselves or if they compete in the
same external markets, a devaluation of the exchange rate in one country
deteriorates the other country‘s competitive advantage. As a consequence,
both countries will likely end up devaluing their currencies to rebalance their
external sectors. Financial links exist when two economies are connected through
the international financial system. When the value of their collateral falls as a
result of a negative shock in one country, leveraged companies need to increase
their reserves. Therefore, they sell part of their valuable holdings in the countries
that are still unaffected by the initial shock. This mechanism propagates the shock
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to other economies. Thirdly, financial markets might transmit shocks across
countries as a result of herding behaviour or panics. At the root of this herding
behaviour is asymmetric information. Information is costly, so investors remain
uninformed. Therefore, investors try to infer future price changes on the basis of
how other markets are reacting. In this context, a change in Thailand‘s asset
prices might be useful information about future changes in Nigeria or Ghana‘s
asset prices. Additionally, in the context of asymmetric information, what the
other market participants are doing might convey information that each
uninformed investor does not have. This type of reaction leads to herding
behaviour, panics, and irrational exuberance.

II.5

Policy Options in Managing Global Capital Flows

There are different views on how governments can maximise the benefits of
financial globalisation while simultaneously minimising its risks (maxi-mini). One of
the most important benefits of financial globalisation is the development of the
financial sector. But, on the other hand, it can also be associated with some
costs, particularly higher sensitivity to crises and contagion. This sensitivity to
financial contagion makes many economists to believe that some degree of
government intervention on financial globalisation is advisable. In spite of this,
there are yet disagreements what governments should do regarding financial
integration.
A first view argues that government intervention is at the root of recent crises. This
view believes that international capital markets are efficient and developed (or
at least international financial markets are more efficient than financial markets in
developing countries). Therefore, countries with underdeveloped financial
markets would benefit from full financial liberalisation, with minimal government
intervention. Certain types of government intervention create distortions that can
lead to moral hazard and crises. In support of this opinion, Akerlof and Romer
(1993) show that government guarantees can induce firms to go broke at
society‘s expense (looting). They claim that once looting becomes established in
one sector, it can distort production in other sectors.
A second view claims that cross-country capital flows should be restricted.
According to this view, anomalies such as asymmetric information, moral hazard,
asset bubbles, speculative attacks, herding behaviour, and contagion are
present in international financial markets. These anomalies make economies
open to capital flows to suffer the consequences of these imperfections. The
recent crises showed that international financial markets punished similarly
countries with different fundamentals and policies. Given this evidence, Krugman
(1998), Stiglitz (2000), and Tobin (1978) argue that government intervention to
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restrict cross-country capital movements can be socially beneficial. In this regard,
Stiglitz (2000) clamours for developing countries to put some limits on capital
inflows to moderate excessive boom-busrt patterns in financial markets.
Governments can mitigate the cost of volatile capital flows, reducing excessive
risk taking and making markets less vulnerable to external shocks, and still pursue
integration with international financial markets.
A third view concentrates on risk management. This view focuses on
strengthening the domestic financial sector and sequencing financial
liberalisation. Obiechina (2010) supports this view by recommending, among
others that capital account liberalisation should be sequenced. This is because
opening a weak domestic financial sector to large capital movements is
potentially risky. If the domestic financial sector does not manage risk properly, is
adequately capitalised, or lacks the right incentives, large capital flows swings
can create severe problems in the domestic financial sector. Since financial crises
can be very costly, this view proposes an adequate regulation and supervision of
the domestic financial system without distinguishing between foreign capital and
domestic capital. Additional proposals include the use of counter-cyclical fiscal
policy, the stability of prices, the active management of reserve requirements,
and the implementation of contingent liquidity arrangements. Improved
prudential regulation and increased market discipline, through more
transparency and information, are also recommended as a way to avoid
excessive risk taking.
From the above reactions, it is clear that capital control measures have important
roles to play, particularly in developing countries. They are measures to smooth
the pro-cyclicality of short-term debt inflows and outflows in and out of countries‘
financial markets. Capital flows tend to be pro-cyclical in the financial markets of
developing countries, meaning that they often get too much during good times
which cause asset bubbles and appreciation in the exchange rate or at least
exchange rate volatility. If there is lots of currency mismatches, or maturity
mismatches, capital account regulations/controls can be used to throw a wedge
into them. Perhaps, the most important reason why nations consider capital
account regulations is to have a more independent monetary policy.

III.

History of Global Governance of Capital Controls

A.

Pre-World War I

In the first age of globalisation which is generally dated from 1870–1914, capital
controls remained largely absent as there was generally little need for capital
controls due to low levels of international trade and financial integration. The
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―core‖ countries of the pre-1914 era largely adhered to the classical gold
standard that by 1880 had evolved from the historic specie regime based on
bimetallism. The gold standard was a system of backing a country's currency with
its gold reserves. Such currencies are freely convertible into gold at a fixed price,
and the country settles all its international trade transactions in gold. Between
1900 and 1914 world's major economic powers were on gold standard, but could
not maintain it during World War I (1914-18). The essence of the classical gold
standard for the core countries was a credible commitment to maintain gold
convertibility and this was embedded in their long history of financial
development. The prevalent view was that adopting a specie standard meant
adherence to sound money with stable prices. Floating regime was considered to
be a radical departure from monetary and fiscal probity to be tolerated only in
the event of temporary emergencies such as wars or financial crises

B.

World War I to World War II: 1914 - 1945

Highly restrictive capital controls were introduced with the outbreak of World War
I. The first widespread capital controls were adopted in World War I as a method
to finance the war effort. At the start of the war, all the major powers suspended
their participation in the gold standard for the duration of the conflict but
maintained fixed-exchange rates. The gold standard with free capital mobility,
however, had to be jettisoned during the inter-war years, except for a brief
period of gold exchange standard, because of the compelling need of the
monetary authorities to pursue their domestic goals.
These restrictions raised revenues in two ways. First, by keeping capital in the
domestic economy, it facilitated the taxation of wealth and interest income.
Second, it permitted a higher inflation rate, which generated more revenue. In
the 1920s, they were generally relaxed, only to be strengthened again in the
wake of the 1929 Great Depression. This was more an ad hoc response to
potentially damaging flows rather than based on a change in normative
economic theory. The use of capital controls peaked during World War II. An
example of capital control in the inter war period was the flight tax introduced in
1931 by Chancellor Brüning of Germany. The tax was needed to limit the removal
of capital from the country by wealthy residents. At that time Germany was
suffering economic hardship due to the Great Depression and the harsh war
reparations imposed on its economy after World War I.

C.

The Bretton Woods Era: 1945–1971

A widespread system of capital controls were decided at the international 1944
Bretton Woods conference . At the end of World War II, international capital was
"caged" by the imposition of strong and wide ranging capital controls as part of
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the newly created Bretton Woods system it was perceived that this would help
protect the interests of ordinary people and the wider economy. Keynes, one of
the principal architects of the Bretton Woods system, envisaged capital controls
as a permanent feature of the international monetary system, though he agreed
that current account convertibility should be adopted once international
conditions had stabilised sufficiently. This essentially meant that currencies were to
be freely convertible for the purposes of international trade in goods and
services, but not for capital account transactions. Following the Keynesian
Revolution, the first two decades after World War II saw little argument against
capital controls from economists, with an exception was Milton Friedman.
However, from the late 1960‘s the effectiveness of capital controls began to
break down.

D.

Transition Period and Washington Consensus: 1971 - 2009

The demise of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s was largely
precipitated by the pursuit of financial policies inconsistent with maintaining the
pegged rate system by some of the key countries, and this has been followed by
an era of a more flexible regime. By the late 1970s, as part of the displacement of
Keynesianism in favor of free market orientated policies and theories, countries
began abolishing their capital controls, starting between 1973 - 1974 with the U.S.,
Canada, Germany and Switzerland and followed by Great Britain in 1979. Most
other advanced and emerging economies followed, chiefly in the 1980s and
early 1990s. During the period spanning from approximately 1980 - 2009, known as
the Washington Consensus era, the normative opinion was that capital controls
were to be avoided except perhaps in a crisis. It was widely held that the
absence of controls allowed capital to freely flow to where it is needed most,
helping not only investors to enjoy good returns, but also helping ordinary people
to benefit from economic growth. During the 1980s many emerging/developing
economies were coerced into following the advanced economies by
abandoning their capital controls as a result of the structural adjustment
programs (SAP) that became inevitable to resolve their debt crisis.
However, the orthodox view that capital controls are a bad thing was
challenged following the 1997 South Asian Financial Crisis. Asian nations that
retained their capital controls escaped the crisis relatively unscratched.
Malaysia's prime minister, Mahathir bin Mohamad imposed capital controls as an
emergency measure in September 1998. Both strict exchange controls and limits
on outflows from portfolio investments, put in place by Malaysian government
were found to be effective in containing the damage from the crisis on the
economy.
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Post Washington Consensus: 2009 and Later

By 2009, the global financial crisis had caused a resurgence towards Keynesian
thought. During the 2008–2012 Icelandic financial crisis, the IMF proposed that
capital controls on outflows should be permitted by Iceland, calling them an
essential feature of the monetary policy framework, given the scale of potential
capital outflows. In the latter half of 2009, as the global economy started to
recover from the global financial crisis, capital inflows to emerging market
economies—especially,
in
Asia
and
Latin
America—surged,
raising
macroeconomic and financial-stability risks similar to the Iceland crisis. Several
emerging market economies responded to these concerns by adopting capital
controls measures; for example, Brazil imposed a tax on the purchase of financial
assets by foreigners and Taiwan restricted overseas investors from buying time
deposits.
The return towards capital controls witnessed pro-capital control statements by
various prominent economists, together with an influential staff position note
prepared by IMF economists in February 2010 (Ostry et al., 2010). A follow-up note
prepared in April 2011, have been hailed as an end of an era that eventually led
to a change in the IMF's long held position that capital controls should be used
only in extremis, as a last resort, and on a temporary basis. In February 2011,
citing evidence from new IMF research (Ostry et al., 2010) that restricting shortterm capital inflows could lower financial-stability risks, over 250 economists
headed by Joseph Stiglitz wrote a letter to the Obama administration asking
them to remove clauses from various bilateral trade agreements that allow the
use of capital controls to be penalised.

IV.

Policy Challenges Associated with Capital Flows and Types of
Controls

A.
Purposes of Capital Controls
At least six core reasons why nations may want to deploy capital control
measures in their various economies. Fear of appreciation: capital inflows cause
upward pressure on the value of the domestic currency, making domestic
producers less competitive in the international market, hurting exports and
therefore the economy. Fear of ―hot money‖: the large injection of money into a
small economy may cause distortions, and eventually a sudden reversion if
foreign investors try to leave simultaneously. Fear of large inflows: large volumes
of capital inflows, even if not all hot money, can cause dislocations in the
financial system. Fear of loss of monetary autonomy: a trinity is always at work: it is
not possible to have a fixed (or highly managed) exchange rate, monetary
policy autonomy, and open capital markets. Specifically, when central banks
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intervene in the exchange market buying foreign currency in order to curb the
appreciation of the exchange rate, they effectively increase the domestic
monetary base. Trying to raise interest rates to offset that effect causes more
capital inflows, as foreign investors rush in to take advantage of higher yields.
Fear of asset bubbles. This is a particularly important issue in the 2008 financial
crisis, since the bursting of the real state bubble was the root cause of the
banking crisis around the globe. Fear of capital ―flight‖ whereby capital may
rapidly leave a nation in the event of a crisis or because of contagion (Grabel,
2003; Epstein, 2005).
These fears have led to five main possibilities for capital control, and further
arranged in Table 1 as well so as : to restrict capital outflows in the event of a
balance of payments crisis; to curb capital inflows, before it leads to crisis; to
check and restructure the composition of capital inflows, in particular to
discourage short-term banking inflows, and favour FDI, relative to other inflows;
impose a tax on foreign exchange transactions, with the aim of reducing
volatility; separate domestic interest rates from foreign, with the aim of restoring
some monetary independence.
1.
Restrict Capital Outflows
Conditional on a speculative attack occurring, controls on capital outflow can
help slow down or minimise the loss of reserves or the required increase in interest
rates. Needless to say, controls on outflows can also weaken the discipline that
international financial markets place on the quality of macroeconomic policy of
a country. For a country experiencing potentially excessive capital inflows,
liberalisation of controls on outflow may offer a way of reducing net national
indebtedness (Epstein, 2012). On the other hand, international investors
sometimes respond to such liberalisation by accelerating the capital inflows,
particularly when such liberalisation is perceived to boosts investors‘ confidence -particularly their confidence that they will be able to take their money back out
of the country in the future if they wish. This logic could be inverted to suggest
that if a country wants to discourage volatile capital inflows, it could do so by
retaining controls on outflows, thereby deliberately depressing investor
confidence.
2.
Curb Capital Inflows
The usual basis for capital controls on inflows, as earlier pointed is to prevent
overvaluation and over indebtedness. It is understood that, high levels of capital
inflow and cumulative indebtedness, often in conjunction with a currency
overvalued in real terms, have been considered key indicators of the risk of
financial crises. Such surges in capital flows usually comes before financial crisis.
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For example, Mexico and Thailand had large net capital inflows in 1994 and 1996
(Frankel and Rose, 1996), respectively, in advance of their financial crises. It is
probably easier to keep capital out than to keep it in. As earlier said,
discouraging inflow (particularly temporary inflows), is meant to limit real
appreciation and aggregate debt, and subsequently to have withstood
contagion from other crises. Such controls have a role to play as a temporary
measure when a country faces a large upsurge of inflows. They might help a
government play for time until it can determine whether the funds are going to
useful investments, which will generate the foreign exchange earnings needed in
the future to service the debt, or whether they are instead going towards mere
consumption. The efficacy of controls on inflows is likely to be greater than
controls on outflows, in part because it is easier to ―scare capital off‖ than to
―keep it in against its will.‖ Enforceability remains a serious limitation however, the
more so as time goes by.
3.
Check the Components of Capital Inflows
The knowledge the capital inflow is a leading indicator to the probability of
currency crashes occurring at a future date. The higher the reliance on FDI, the
lower the probability of crisis (Aremu, 2005). The higher the reliance on foreigncurrency borrowing that is short-term or intermediated through banks, the higher
the probability of crisis. In addition, bank flows in particular are more vulnerable to
moral hazard problems than are other sorts of modes of finance, and that a
mismatch of short-term bank liabilities with longer-term bank assets (e.g., real
estate) leaves a country more vulnerable. Flows of longer-term securities have the
advantage that the price of a stock or bond adjusts automatically in the event of
adverse developments (―risk-sharing‖), with fewer sticky negotiations with bankers
over terms of rollovers or restructuring.
4.
Introduce Tax on all Foreign Exchange Transactions
Introducing a small uniform tax on all buying and selling of foreign exchange (ie
Tobin tax), with no attempt to ascertain the purpose of the transactions is equally
a convenient way of discouraging unwanted capital flows. It is believed that a
small Tobin tax would automatically dampen short-term capital movements (such
as the majority of transactions that take place in well-developed foreign
exchange markets, which are typically unwound within hours), more than it would
discourage long-term movements or trade in goods and services.
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Table 1 Purposes of Capital Controls
S/N

Direction
of Control

Purpose of Control

Methods

1

Generate Revenue/
Finance War Effort

Outﬂows

2

Financial Repression/
Credit Allocation

3

Correct a Balance of
Payments Deﬁcit

4

Correct a Balance of
Payments Surplus

5

Prevent
Potentially
Volatile Inﬂows

6

Prevent
Financial
Destabilisation

7

Prevent
Appreciation

8

Restrict
Foreign
Ownership
of
Domestic Assets

Controls on capital outﬂows permit a country
to run higher inﬂation with a given ﬁxedexchange rate and also hold down domestic
interest rates.
Governments can use the ﬁnancial system to
reward favored industries or to raise revenue,
may use capital controls to prevent capital
from going abroad to seek higher returns.
Controls on outﬂows reduce demand for
foreign
assets
without
contractionary
monetary policy or devaluation. This allows a
higher rate of inﬂation than other- wise would
be possible.
Controls on inﬂows reduce foreign demand
for domestic assets without expansionary
monetary policy or revaluation. This allows a
lower rate of inﬂation than would otherwise
be possible.
Restricting inﬂows enhances macroeconomic
stability by reducing the pool of capital that
can leave a country during a crisis.
Capital controls can restrict or change the
composition of international capital ﬂows that
can exacerbate perverse incentives in the
domestic ﬁnancial system.
Restricting inﬂows prevents the necessity of
monetary expansion and greater domestic
inﬂation that would cause a real appreciation
of the currency.
Foreign ownership of certain domestic
assets—especially natural resources—can
generate resentment.

9

Preserve Savings for
Domestic Use

Outﬂows

10

Protect
Domestic
Financial Firms

The beneﬁts of investing in the domestic
economy may not fully accrue to savers so
the economy, as a whole, can be made
better off by restricting the outﬂow of capital.
Controls that temporarily segregate domestic
ﬁnancial sectors from the rest of the world
may permit domestic ﬁrms to attain
economies of scale to compete in world
markets.

Real

Outﬂows

Outﬂows

Inﬂows

Inﬂows

Inﬂows

Inﬂows

Inﬂows

Inﬂows
and
Outﬂows
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5.
Differentiate Interest Rates
Differentiating domestic interest rates from foreign interest rates in order to retain
some independence for monetary policy is another way of controlling capital
flows. The goal of policy independence is not directly relevant to the goal of
minimising financial crises. Like it happened in Southeast Asia, in the face of large
capital inflows they were able to sterilise the increase in reserves, so as to avoid
real appreciations of their currencies. A reasonable interpretation is that they in
fact were able to attain (only) a modest amount of policy independence
through modestly incomplete liberalisation of capital markets.
B.
Capital Controls and Exchange Rate Issues
Movement of capital flows could cause excessive exchange rate pressures, as it
happened in early 1980‘s in Nigeria and the country was forced to adopt the
second-tier foreign exchange market (SFEM). In fact, the magnitude and
gyrations of capital flows have become the primary determinant of exchange
rate movements on a day-to-day basis for most developing countries, rather than
trade deficits and economic growth as in the past. Adverse expectations,
especially fuelled by the uni-directional movement of currencies have often
turned out to be self-fulfilling prophesies. For the majority of these economies,
such exchange rate movements have had significant impact on both financial
and real sector of the economy seriously affecting domestic growth trajectories.
It is in this context that, the choice of an appropriate exchange rate regime and
the conduct of monetary policy has become more challenging tasks for
monetary authorities. While fixed exchange rate is seen to have the advantage
of a nominal anchor for ―importing‖ credibility, providing transparency, reducing
unpredictable volatility and transactions costs, floating exchange rate has the
benefits of monetary independence, insulation from real shocks and a less
disruptive adjustment mechanism in the face of nominal rigidities. Accordingly,
the choice of exchange regime is not straightforward and is in fact contingent on
a host of factors, such as the size of the economy, degree of openness, product
diversification/export structure, divergence of domestic inflation from trading
partners, labor mobility, vulnerability to real/nominal shocks, fiscal policy flexibility,
capital mobility, credibility of policymakers and degree of economic/financial
development.
No doubt, extensive work has been done in the area of exchange rate regime,
across countries, yet it still continues to attract a fair share of attention on regular
basis. Although the results of empirical studies on the experiences of different
exchange regimes across countries differ, by and large, a majority of the studies
infer that for relatively poor countries with little access to international capital
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markets, pegged exchange rate regimes had worked well, delivering both
relatively low inflation and relatively high exchange rate regime durability
(Hussain et al., 2004). As countries developed economically and institutionally,
some of them seem to have found considerable benefits in adopting a more
flexible exchange rate system. In fact, the key distinction for exchange rate
regime choice between advanced and emerging economies is found in the
degree of financial maturity.
Because the determination of exchange rate has long been a sensitive topic in
international finance, opinions differ as to which types of capital flows are
important for exchange rate determination because some flows appear to
matter far more than others do. The following questions always emerge: First, do
net cross border capital flows explain exchange rate movements and if yes, is it
net bond flows or net equities flows that matters? Second, is it the net
accumulation of foreign assets that matter? Thirdly, through which channels do
equity return differentials and interest rate differentials affect the nominal
exchange rate? In foreign exchange markets, exchange rates are explained, to
a large extent by the level of capital flows because the flows convey investors‘
private information. However, it has been difficult to identify which capital flow
components convey the most private information, partly because private
information by its very nature cannot be observed directly. In an IMF recent
working paper, Gyntelberg et al., (2012) provided robust empirical evidence,
using capital flows into Thailand as a sample, that not all capital flows influence
exchange rate equally: capital flows induced by foreign investors‘ stock market
transactions have both an economically significant and permanent impact on
exchange rate, whereas capital flows induced by foreign investors‘ transactions
in the government bond market do not.
The question is whether the private information contained in foreign exchange
order flow is based primarily on information generated initially in stock or bond
markets and is then subsequently transmitted to the foreign exchange market
where it may generate follow-up adjustments in the currency‘s exchange value.
There are several types of private information that stock market investors may
have about the fundamental determinants of a firm‘s value. These include
knowledge of the quality of the firm‘s products, the prospects for successful
product innovation, management quality, and the strength and likely strategies
of the firm‘s competitors. Private information may further include passively
collected information about macro variables and other exchange rate
fundamentals which may be dispersed among customers. This type of private
information is relevant for both equity and bond market participants.
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Private but dispersed information characterises many macro variables at the
center of exchange rate modelling, such as output, money demand, and
consumer preferences. These variables are first realised at the micro or
household/firm level and only later aggregated by markets and/or governments.
For some macro variables, government- provided aggregations exist, but their
publication lags the underlying realizations by weeks and months, leaving room
for market-based aggregation well in advance of their eventual publication. For
other measures, such as risk preferences and money demand functions, the task
of aggregation is left fully to markets.
These authors proposed that when it comes to external capital flows; it is foreign
investors‘ private information that related to the stock market and not the bond
market which drives the exchange rate. They tested this proposition using dailyfrequency data from financial markets in Thailand, and found strong evidence in
favour of this proposition. Specifically, they found that only the relatively small
portion of foreign exchange flows that is driven by foreign investors‘ transactions
in the stock market has a lasting effect on the exchange rate. Given that these
flows in the stock and foreign exchange markets are consistent with information
asymmetry between domestic and foreign investors, they infer that the reason
these flows have a lasting effect on the exchange rate is that they convey
investors‘ private information to the market. In contrast, the much larger portion
of foreign exchange flows that is not explained by stock market variables plays at
most a transitory role in determining the exchange rate.
Taken together, these findings strongly suggest that (at least for the case of
Thailand) foreign exchange order flow is relevant for the exchange rate if it has to
reflect investors‘ private information about the prospects of individual firms. Their
findings also suggest that data collection efforts on external capital flows might
be made more informative if they were categorized according to their private
information content; and that analysts should focus their attention on those flows
that convey private information.
Expected Stance on Nigeria’s Exchange Rate Policy
Overtime, Nigeria‘s exchange rate policy essentially focuses on managing
volatility with no fixed rate target, while allowing the underlying demand and
supply conditions to determine the exchange rate movements over a period in
an orderly way. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) continues to follow the
approach of watchfulness, caution and flexibility in regard to foreign exchange
market as well as co-ordinates its market operations carefully, particularly in
regard to the foreign exchange market with appropriate monetary, regulatory
and other intervention measures as considered necessary from time to time in the
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foreign exchange market. From this my observation, the conduct of exchange
rate policy in Nigeria today appears to be guided by three major reasons viz: (i)
to maintain orderly conditions in the foreign exchange market by providing
foreign exchange as considered necessary from time to time, and to prevent the
emergence of destabilising and speculative activities of participants in the
foreign exchange market; (ii) to help maintain an adequate level of foreign
exchange reserves; and (iii) to help eliminate market constraints with a view to
facilitating the development of a healthy foreign exchange market.
If this agrees with the monetary authority‘s position, it is my suggestion that the
various tiers of the governments in the country should be carried along for fiscal
prudence. This is because the overall approach to foreign exchange rate and
reserve management should be judiciously built upon a host of identifiable
factors and other contingencies, which include: the size of the current account
deficit of the country; the magnitude of short-term liabilities (including current
repayment obligations on long-term loans); the possible variability in portfolio
investments and other types of capital flows; the unanticipated pressures on the
balance of payments arising out of external shocks; and movements in the
repatriable foreign currency deposits of non-resident Nigerians.
Among the issues that could affect the exchange rates and reserves of the
country of which the CBN must collaborate with the various tiers of governments:
First, the need for clear hierarchy in the nature of capital flows with equity flows
getting more preference to short-term debt flows. Within equity investments,
governments should ensure that FDI should be given precedence over portfolio
investment.
Secondly, the Nigeria external liabilities have to be kept under constant watch
and any eventuality of reverse movement should be factored in. For this purpose:

external debt should be calculated not only in terms of its original maturity
but also residual maturity,

there should be a clear understanding of the quality and magnitude of
contingent liabilities and derivatives,

maturity profile of external borrowings should be carefully modulated so
as to prevent payments that are difficult to implement,

short term debt/trade credits need to be constantly monitored, and

there should be flexibility of retirement/prepayment of costly debt at times
of benign international interest rate regime.
Thirdly, that management of capital account involves a distinction not only
between residents and non-residents or between inflows and outflows but also
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between individuals, governments‘ functionaries, corporate institutions and
financial intermediaries. The financial intermediaries are usually a greater source
of volatility amongst these. Therefore, a necessary condition for capital account
liberalisation of Nigerian economy is the presence of a well-regulated and
mature financial sector with strong supervisory framework from the various organs
of the government. Only after Nigerian financial sector has attained some
degree of credibility and resilience could it gain from capital flows emanating
from better accounting procedures, transparency norms, corporate governance
etc.
Lastly, our foreign exchange reserves should at least be sufficient to cover likely
variations in capital flows or the ―liquidity-at-risk‖ and not to be continuously
depleted monthly. Furthermore, adequate reserves, keeping in view the national
balance sheet considerations, which include public and private sectors, also
provide comfort and confidence to market participants. In addition, constant
improvements in information base needs to be made to all stakeholders in the
economy to ensure the appropriateness, timeliness and quality of data
dissemination. It is important to communicate to the public, in a transparent way
as possible, the type of policy that is being followed.

III.

Capital Flow, Capital Control and ECOWAS Financial Integration
Program

The lessons learnt from the Asian Financial Crisis and even the recent global
financial crisis reinforce the need to monitor the capital flows in the region and
channel appropriately the region‘s savings towards productive investments within
the region. Unfortunately, ECOWAS financial markets are still individually and the
range of products and openness within ECOWAS remains low. Unless ECOWAS
financial markets work together to achieve parity with developed markets in
terms of cost, liquidity, product range and technology investments, investors and
issuers in the region will rely on the larger and more liquid markets outside the
community, thus making the economic integration of the region less relevant.
This threat of marginalisation has acted as a catalyst for greater capital market
integration among ECOWAS Member States.

V.1

Objectives of ECOWAS Financial Market Integration

Under ECOWAS Common Investment Market (ECIM), greater cross-border access
to investors can help broaden the investor base and range of products, and can
provide the liquidity, scale and capacity to compete globally. Furthermore,
financial integration can, by facilitating access to a larger pool of issuers, investors
and financial services providers, build awareness of ECOWAS as an asset class
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and enhance the attractiveness of the region for global capital flows. Holistic
benefits of financial market integration include the following:












There will be overall benefit to Member States in terms of promoting and
facilitating economic growth, enhancing the breadth and depth of the
financial market and diversifying sources of financing, investment
channels and investor base.
For investors, financial market integration will lead to enhanced product
and service innovation, and lower prices for financial services as
competition lowers transactions costs and allows larger regional firms to
exploit economies of scale and scope. Investors can also now diversify
their investments to a greater extent than before.
The integration of financial markets will allow the financial intermediaries
to benefit from economies of scale, leading to improved and more
innovative services at lower prices, as well as from the opportunity to tap
the larger pool of investors‘ resources in the region.
For companies/issuers, harmonisation of standards can considerably
reduce the administrative burden and costs by replacing many different
sets of diverging rules with a single set. Under such harmonisation of
standards, issuers seeking to issue equity or debt securities in more than
one ECOWAS Member States will be required to prepare only one set of
disclosure documents, with additional limited wrap-around for multijurisdiction offers.
For governments and regulators, financial market integration will lead to a
more efficient allocation of financial resources, arising from the fact that
savings can flow more easily and at lower cost to investment and
because barriers will have been dismantled. Through sequenced
liberalisation and integration process, regulation of cross-border trades
and investment will be strengthened as regulators are able to offer
greater protection for investors. In addition, through harmonization and
mutual recognition agreements, ECOWAS financial markets will be able to
improve their regulatory standards by benchmarking with international
standards and adopting best practices.
Integration of financial system across Member States will also hasten the
development of the less developed financial markets in the region as they
would be able to benefit from the experiences of the more developed
ECOWAS financial markets than from other Member States and thus
accelerate their adoption of regional/ international standards.

Because of these reasons, and in spite of this paper‘s position on the need for
capital control, there is a strong case for ECOWAS to step up its financial
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integration initiatives to enhance capital flow among its Member States under its
ECIM initiative. The Commission is taking necessary steps to ensure that the
liberalisation of the financial sector among Member States is not an obstacle to
the efforts of each individual market to develop themselves. To this end, the
initiative is being worked out in a systematic and complimentary fashion so as to
ensure that domestic and regional efforts progress efficiently and in tandem with
Vision 2020. Policy harmonisation and coordination efforts are being enhanced
and clear goal setting put in place for the short, medium and long-term. The
Commission believes that having a clear roadmap on the liberalisation of the
sector is critical with established milestones and regional stakeholders providing a
systematic approach to ensure efficient financial integration.

V.2

ECOWAS Capital Market Integration

Given that ECOWAS capital markets are at different stages of development,
rendering large differences in market practices, institutional development and
regulatory standards, laws and process, an opt-in approach is proposed. This
means that Member States which are ready will proceed with the support of
ECOWAS Commission, while the other jurisdictions will undertake a more gradual
approach and pursue integration initiatives as and when they are ready. The
Commission is doing this through two approaches: First, strengthening ECOWAS
capital markets through development and integration of the community. This is
achieved through greater harmonisation in offering standards, facilitating mutual
recognition, allowing greater flexibility in language and laws in securities issuance,
enhancing tax structures and facilitating market linkages. Secondly, allowing
greater capital mobility via its on-going regional payment and settlement system.
This is expected to be achieved through liberalisation of capital movements
across Member States, subject to having in place necessary safeguard
mechanisms.
The Commission expects its various Committees to work out the modalities
towards achieving the following:

1.

Regulatory Alignment and Harmonization

Areas requiring attention of the Committees include regulation of special purpose
vehicles, allowing the use of omnibus accounts for custody of exchange linked
trades, prevention of cross-border market misconduct, and disclosure of material
information in a timely manner to investors of exchanges, and non-discriminatory
investor protection schemes and standards. The Committees are to set out a midterm targets to achieve the ECOWAS interlinked market as soon as possible
through:
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Alignment of environments – regulatory and legal (trading, clearing,
settlement and custody, market conduct, enforcement and disclosure),
and market practices (settlement deadlines and periods, operational
hours, corporate action processing rules)
Address impediments and barriers such as capital controls
Address cooperation and partnership issues such as technical assistance,
technology and infrastructure

Market Infrastructure to Facilitate Connectivity

The Committees are looking into the following trading models: Dual / cross listing of securities Issue: Regulatory cost of listing due to
disclosure and listing requirements of both exchanges
 Depository receipt instrument Issue: When a company depository receipt is
traded on a foreign exchange, the listed company needs to satisfy the
disclosure and listing requirements of both exchanges – again, this could add
to the regulatory cost
 Offshore trading Issues: Issuers not subject to listing requirements of the
foreign exchange and not therefore required to disclose information. Only
need to comply with domestic requirements. Arrangements needed to allow
dissemination, ease of access to information from corporate disclosures of
the foreign issuers

IV.

Conclusion

VI.1

Framework for Resiliency of Nigerian Capital Flow Management

The basic neoclassical model suggests that, with rising financial globalisation,
capital should flow from rich to poor countries, making people in both sets of
countries better off by enabling a more efficient international allocation of
capital from countries where capital is less productive to those where it ought to
be more productive. In addition, financial flows should allow for more efficient
sharing of risk across countries, thereby facilitating the smoothing of national
consumption against country-specific shocks to national output. These benefits
are likely to be greater for developing countries, like Nigeria, as they have less
capital and more volatile growth, implying that both the growth and risk sharing
benefits would be larger for them. Have international capital flows delivered
these benefits? Unfortunately, evidences that financial integration have
accounted for systematically higher growth rates in developing economies is not
robust. On the contrary, some observers have argued that financial globalisation
is the proximate determinant of the financial crises experienced by many
developing economies over the last two decades. And yet, financial
globalisation has continued apace, with rising cross-border financial flows. In
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practice, large capital flows can create substantial challenges for policymakers.
These challenges have recently come to the forefront again for emerging market
economies.
Capital controls, which prevent money from moving in and out of an economy
irrespective of the economic health of the nation (causing financial instability),
can insulate domestic monetary policy to some extent. This presentation has
argued that such preventive method is acceptable particularly in emerging
countries like Nigeria. Two types of such controls have been considered: controls
on capital outflows, and controls on capital inflows. However, controls on
outflows – and, in particular, quantitative controls on outflows, are largely
ineffective because they are easily circumvented, encourage corruption and,
may not help the adjustment process. A major drawback of controls on outflows
is that, in most cases, they are not used as a temporary device to face a crisis
situation but most often they become a permanent feature of the country‘s
incentive structure. For capital controls on inflows however, it was argued that it:
make monetary policy more independent; alter the composition of capital flows;
reduce real exchange rate pressures. For both controls, it would be interesting, for
policy purposes, for the CBN to examine differences between short run and long
run impacts of the measures, so as to ascertain how quickly control measures lose
their effectiveness.
From this presentation, two critical questions emerge under the current financial
globalisation. First, is global financial integration avoidable? Secondly, if so,
should it be avoided by Nigerian policy makers? If the answer to either of these
questions is no, then Nigeria is going to have to live in a world characterised by
occasional large shocks emanating from the capital account of the balance of
payments. If this is so, it is likely that surges and reversals will continue to be facts
of life for the economy like all other countries. It is the responsibility of the CBN to
work out how the country can take advantage of external capital, while
achieving resiliency to inflows/outflows in a financially-integrated world. How can
such resiliency be achieved?
First, the composition of the country‘s external financing seems to be of
paramount importance. Not only does the volatility of capital flows differ along a
spectrum from FDI at one extreme to short-term foreign currency- denominated
borrowing from banks at the other, but the growth benefits of different types of
inflows seem to line up fairly closely with their stability. There is a strong
professional presumption that FDI is beneficial for growth, and there‘s a significant
amount of evidence supporting positive growth effects of portfolio equity flows,
while there is little evidence that the more volatile debt-related flows have
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significant growth benefits (see Jeanne et al., 2012). This suggests that Nigerian
economy can reap growth benefits from international financial integration while
enhancing their resiliency to the ebbs and flows of international capital flows if
her external financing takes the form of equity rather than debt. But achieving
this outcome has a strong institutional component: reducing corruption across the
three tiers of governance, ensuring well-defined property rights, maintaining
appropriate accounting and disclosure standards, and high standards for
corporate governance.
A second important component of resiliency is a well-functioning domestic
financial sector, meaning a financial sector that is well capitalised and regulated
to minimise credit risk and to avoid currency mismatches in financial institutions
and their customers, as well as one that is protected against panic by a wellfunctioning central bank (lender of last resort) and well-designed deposit
insurance system. Resiliency is achieved under such a system by avoiding the
misallocation of resources arising from capital inflows, by reducing the chances
that inflows may trigger credit booms and asset-price bubbles, and by reducing
the vulnerability of the system to sudden capital outflows.
Third, resiliency is also likely to be enhanced by an exchange rate regime that
allows substantial short-run exchange rate variability, supported by a large stock
of liquid foreign exchange reserves (a managed float with active intervention as
the CBN regularly do in the foreign exchange market). Short-run exchange rate
variability not only avoids the perception of exchange rate guarantees that may
favour short-term foreign exchange-denominated capital inflows, but more
importantly, provides an automatic stabiliser against the effects on
macroeconomic stability of surges in capital inflows or sudden outflows. The
overheating associated with large inflow surges can be at least partially offset by
real exchange rate appreciation, and the contractionary effects of sudden
outflows can be ameliorated by real exchange rate depreciation. The
accumulation of reserves, by CBN, during inflow episodes and their use during
sudden stops, on the other hand, can ensure that real exchange rate variability is
not excessive, thereby preventing capital flows from too severely aggravating the
signal extraction problem faced by agents deciding how to allocate capital
between traded and non-traded activities in the domestic economy.
Fourth, because monetary policy is often the first line of defence against
macroeconomic shocks, including those emanating from capital inflows and
outflows, a resilient domestic environment will feature a central bank that can
flexibly implement effective monetary policy without being constrained by
reputational concerns, by fiscal dominance, or by concerns over its own
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solvency. This implies a central bank that is independent, has a good
understanding of the domestic monetary transmission mechanism, has cultivated
an anti-inflationary reputation, and operates a well-understood policy rule.
Finally, the single most important component of resiliency is probably a fiscal one,
including a safe margin of fiscal solvency, a set of fiscal institutions that allow the
implementation of fiscal restraint during boom times, a preponderance of longterm, domestic currency denominated debt rather than short-term foreign
currency debt among the government‘s liabilities, and strong automatic fiscal
stabilisers. A safe margin of fiscal solvency is critical to prevent concerns about
the government‘s ability to service its debt itself becoming a driver of capital
outflows. However, it is also important to allow the government to run deficits
when required to stabilise the economy in response to capital outflows triggered
by other factors. It is also important that a country‘s fiscal institutions allow it to
resist pressures to spend or cut taxes during good times (i.e., when output is
above potential). Policy responses to capital-inflow episodes that favor a tight
fiscal-loose monetary policy mix is likely to have a variety of beneficial effects, so
institutions that encourage the exercise of fiscal restraint in booms are an
important component of resiliency. Similarly, avoiding reliance on short-term
foreign currency debt makes the government less vulnerable to Mexican-style
liquidity crises. Designing strong automatic fiscal stabilisers (such as countercyclical transfer payments) would help minimise reliance on discretionary fiscal
policy responses to both inflows and outflows, which may take time to implement.
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